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Time-energy high-dimensional quantum key distribution (HD-QKD) leverages the high-dimensional nature
of time-energy entangled biphotons and the loss tolerance of single-photon detection to achieve long-distance
key distribution with high photon information efficiency. To date, the general-attack security of HD-QKD has
only been proven in the asymptotic regime, while HD-QKD’s finite-key security has only been established for
a limited set of attacks. Here we fill this gap by providing a rigorous HD-QKD security proof for general
attacks in the finite-key regime. Our proof relies on a novel entropic uncertainty relation that we derive for
time and conjugate-time measurements using dispersive optics, and our analysis includes an efficient decoy-
state protocol in its parameter estimation. We present numerically-evaluated secret-key rates illustrating the
feasibility of secure and composable HD-QKD over metropolitan-area distances when the system is subjected
to the most powerful eavesdropping attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure communi-
cation based on fundamental laws of quantum physics [1, 2],
as opposed to the security that is presumed from computa-
tional complexity in conventional public-key cryptography.
Current work on QKD focuses on patching security holes
in practical implementations, increasing secret-key rates and
secure-transmission distances, and unifying understanding of
the many different protocols [3]. Existing QKD protocols
can be divided into two major categories: discrete-variable
(DV) [1, 4–6] and continuous-variable (CV) [7] QKD. The
predominant DV-QKD is more robust to loss than CV-QKD,
and thus offers longer secure-transmission distance [8–11].
CV-QKD, on the other hand, offers higher photon information
efficiency (PIE) than DV-QKD, and thus potentially higher
key rates at short distances [12].
High-dimensional QKD (HD-QKD) exploits the best fea-
tures of DV and CV protocols to simultaneously achieve high
PIE and long secure-transmission distance [13–19]. One of
the most appealing candidates for implementation is time-
energy HD-QKD [17, 20–25]. It generates keys using the de-
tection times of time-energy entangled photon pairs, whose
continuous nature permits encoding of extremely large al-
phabets. The security analysis of time-energy HD-QKD has
been improving ever since the protocol was proposed [20–25].
Nevertheless, a rigorous security proof that satisfies the com-
posability condition [26] and takes full account of the finite-
size effects against general attacks (the most powerful eaves-
dropping attack) has been missing. For this reason, the feasi-
bility of secure, metropolitan-area, time-energy HD-QKD us-
ing a reasonable time interval for signal transmission has yet
to be fully established.
In this paper we make three contributions. First, we derive a
new entropic uncertainty relation between time and conjugate-
time measurements that are made via non-local dispersion
cancellation. Second, we use the new uncertainty principle to
prove the composable security of time-energy HD-QKD in the
finite-key regime against general (coherent) attacks. Third, we
find the dispersion strength for the conjugate-time basis trans-
formation [21] that maximizes HD-QKD’s secret-key rate.
The entropic uncertainty relation is indispensable for an-
alyzing general attacks against time-energy HD-QKD. Al-
though an entropic uncertainty relation for field quadratures
has been developed [27], and applied recently to CV-QKD
security analysis [28], it cannot be directly applied to time-
energy HD-QKD because time and conjugate-time measure-
ments are not described by maximally incompatible operators
[29], such as position and momentum. To overcome this chal-
lenge, we construct a new entropic uncertainty relation specif-
ically for time and conjugate-time measurements. Because
entropic uncertainty relations figure prominently in quantum
metrology [30], quantum randomness certification [31, 32],
entanglement witnesses [33, 34], two-party cryptography [35,
36], QKD security analysis [11, 37–41], and other applica-
tions [42], we expect that our uncertainty relation for time
and conjugate-time measurements may have uses well beyond
what will be presented below.
The secret-key rate formula we obtain using our entropic
uncertainty relation allows us to verify important advan-
tages that HD-QKD offers over alternative protocols. In par-
ticular, HD-QKD offers higher PIE (3.3 bits/photon) than
both CV-QKD (0.5 bits/photon [43]) and DV-QKD (0.1
bits/photon [44]), thus ensuring higher secret-key rates un-
der photon-starved conditions, in which the photon-detection
rate is much lower than the photon-generation rate because
of the loss incurred in long-distance propagation and the rel-
atively long recovery times of available single-photon de-
tectors. Also, HD-QKD offers a longer maximum secure-
transmission distance for general attacks (e.g., 160 km for a
30-min session using the system parameters given below in
Table I) as compared to that for CV-QKD [28, 45], even in the
case of reverse reconciliation (e.g., 16 km [43]). Furthermore,
because our entropic uncertainty relation is parametrized by
the HD-QKD protocol’s time-bin duration, δ, and conjugate-
time basis transformation’s group-velocity dispersion (GVD)
2coefficient, βD , optimizing the βD value can increase HD-
QKD’s secure-transmission distance to 210 km—and provide
a 17 Mbit/s expected secret-key rate at zero distance—without
resorting to a higher clock rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
HD-QKD protocol is described briefly in Sec. II, with a de-
tailed account—including its use of decoy states for channel
estimation—appearing in Appendix A. The security analysis
for coherent attacks in the finite-key regime is contained in
Sec. III. Its security proof relies on the entropic uncertainty re-
lation that is derived in Sec. IV. (For comparison, the entropic
uncertainty relation obtained from the conventional dilation
assumption is presented in Appendix B.) A numerical evalua-
tion of HD-QKD’s secret-key rate and PIE follows in Sec. V,
which illustrates the advantages offered by this protocol, and
Sec. VI provides summarizing discussion.
II. PROTOCOL
Time-energy HD-QKD that relies on dispersive optics
works as follows [21, 22]. In each round, Alice generates a
time-energy entangled photon pair from a spontaneous para-
metric down-conversion (SPDC) source, sends one photon to
Bob and retains the other. Alice and Bob choose indepen-
dently and at random to measure their photons in either the
time basis (T) or the conjugate-time basis (W), where the lat-
ter is a dispersive-optics proxy for a frequency measurement.
Alice and Bob discretize their outcomes into time bins of du-
ration δ. The process repeats forN rounds until Alice and Bob
obtain enough detections to begin post-processing. At the end
of all measurements, the two sides reveal their basis choices
and discard all data measured using mismatched bases. Secret
keys are extracted from the events in which Alice and Bob
both chose the T basis, while the W basis outcomes are pub-
licly announced for parameter estimation. Using the decoy-
state method [4–6, 24, 44], Alice and Bob estimate the number
of detections in T that were generated from single-pair SPDC
emissions, and the corresponding L1 code distance in the W
basis, see Appendix C for the details. They abort the pro-
tocol if this distance exceeds a predetermined value d0 (see
Appendix D). Otherwise, they perform error correction and
privacy amplification to generate the secret key.
The conjugate-time measurement for the W basis is real-
ized by direct detection at Alice and Bob’s terminals after they
have sent their photons through normal and anomalous GVD
elements, respectively [21, 22]. These GVD elements’ disper-
sion coefficients have equal magnitudes (and opposite signs)
so their effects are non-locally canceled [46]. As a result, Al-
ice and Bob’s W-basis measurements are as strongly corre-
lated as those in the T basis, i.e., the dispersion transformation
allows them to perform a spectral-correlation measurement
with only time-resolved single-photon detection [21, 22].
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Security Definition
Given that the parameter-estimation test is passed with
probability ppass, Alice and Bob end up with final keys that
are classical random vectors, KA and KB, which might be
correlated with a quantum system, E, held by Eve. Math-
ematically, this situation corresponds to a classical-quantum
state ρKAE =
1
|S|
∑
s |s〉〈s| ⊗ ρsE, where {|s〉} denotes an or-
thonormal basis for Alice’s dimension-|S| key space, and the
subscript E indicates Eve’s quantum state. We characterize a
QKD protocol by its correctness and secrecy. For that we use
a notion of security based on the approach developed in [26].
A protocol is called ǫc-correct if the probability thatKA dif-
fers from KB is smaller than ǫc. We say that a protocol is
ǫs-secret if the state ρKAE is ǫs-close to the ideal situation de-
scribed by the tensor product of uniformly distributed keys on
Alice’s side and Eve’s quantum state, UKA ⊗ ρE, such that
ppass‖ρKAE − UKA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫs. A QKD protocol is then
said to be ǫ-secure if it is both ǫc-correct and ǫs-secret, with
ǫc + ǫs ≤ ǫ. Our security definitions ensure that the protocol
remains secure in combination with any other protocol, i.e.,
the protocol is secure in the universally composable frame-
work [26].
B. Assumptions
Before deriving our lower bound on secret-key length,
we first specify the assumptions that will be employed:
(1) Alice’s SPDC source produces independent, identically-
distributed biphotons whose correlation time and coherence
time are well characterized. (2) For each pump pulse, Alice
is able to randomly set her SPDC source’s biphoton intensity
(mean photon-pairs generated per pump pulse) to be either
µ1, µ2, or µ3 with probabilities pµ1 , pµ2 , and pµ3 . (3). Alice
and Bob’s laboratories are secure, i.e., free from any infor-
mation leakage. (4) Alice and Bob independently and ran-
domly choose between measuring in the time and conjugate-
time bases with probabilities q and 1 − q. Most of these
assumptions are already made in conventional CV-QKD and
DV-QKD security analysis.
C. Security Proof
In order to characterize information leakage in a realistic
quantum communication system with a finite number of com-
munication rounds, we use smooth min-entropy instead of
von Neumann entropy [26, 47]. Discretizing Alice and Bob’s
photon-detection times to time bins of duration δ results in
data vectors comprised of integers representing bin numbers.
In particular, with random vectors XA and XB denoting Al-
ice and Bob’s raw keys from her µ1-intensity transmissions,
Eve’s uncertainty (lack of knowledge) is measured by her dif-
ficulty in guessing Alice’s raw key XA, i.e., the conditional
3smooth min-entropy Hmin(XA|E), where E denotes Eve’s
quantum state. Hmin(XA|E) quantifies the randomness that
can be extracted from XA which is statistically independent
of E [26, 47] with error probability ǫ.
The secret-key length ℓ that is ǫs-secret is given by [26]
ℓ ≥ Hǫmin(XA|E)− leakEC + log2(ǫ2sǫc). (1)
Here, leakEC is the information leaked to Eve during error cor-
rection, which can be directly measured during that correction
process, and Hǫmin(XA|E) is the smooth min-entropy maxi-
mized over states that are ǫ close to the classical-quantum state
ρXAE =
1
|S|
∑
s |s〉〈s| ⊗ ρsE. The correctness of the protocol
is guaranteed by the key-verification step, which uses a two-
universal hash function to ensure that Bob’s corrected key dif-
fers from Alice’s with probability at most ǫhash, implying that
the protocol is ǫc-correct with ǫc = ǫhash.
The essential insight is that Eve’s information about the µ1-
intensity, T-basis detection times can be bounded using the
complementary W-basis measurements. In particular, if Alice
and Bob’s W-basis measurements are highly correlated, then
Eve’s knowledge about the outcome of their T-basis measure-
ments is nearly zero, because the two observables are incom-
patible.
Let YA and YB be Alice and Bob’s random vectors of
µ1-intensity conjugate-time measurement outcomes. With-
out loss of generality we set the length of these four classical
strings to be equal: |XA| = |XB| = |YA| = |YB| = nT,µ1 .
Then, from [27, 28, 38, 39], we have the uncertainty relation:
Hǫmin(XA|E) +Hǫmax(YA|YB) ≥ −nT,µ1 log2[c(δ, βD)],(2)
where the smooth max-entropy Hǫmax(YA|YB) measures the
amount of information needed to reconstruct YA given YB
with error probability bounded above by ǫ, and c(δ, βD) is the
overlap between the time and conjugate-time measurement
operators, which depends on δ, the time-bin duration, and βD ,
the magnitude of the GVD elements’ dispersion coefficient.
With Π = {Πn} and Π′ = {Π′m} being an arbitrary pair
of positive operator-valued meausurements (POVMs), their
overlap, c(Π,Π′) = supn,m
∥∥√Πn√Π′m∥∥2, quantifies their
incompatibility, i.e., lower values of c(Π,Π′) mean increased
incompatibility. Our uncertainty bound involves the overlap-
quantified incompatibility between the time and conjugate-
time POVMs whose outcomes are used for key generation
and parameter estimation, respectively. Typically, see Sec. V,
lower c(δ, βD) values allow longer secret keys to be extracted.
Our tri-partite entropic uncertainty relation and the security
analysis that follows therefrom are adapted from CV-QKD’s
finite-key analysis [28], an approach that works for all QKD
protocols which rely on a pair of incompatible continuous
measurements for key generation and parameter estimation.
In our case, the security analysis requires accounting for our
use of discretized time and conjugate-time measurements that
are obtained from underlying continuous POVMs. Note that
the different measurement operators employed in different
QKD protocols lead to different overlap behaviors in their en-
tropic uncertainty relations.
The major difficulty in determining c(δ, βD) for our
protocol comes from the absence of negative energy for
electromagnetic-field modes, which implies that under the
conventional commutation relation, the time-measurement
operator cannot be projective [48, 49], thus preventing exist-
ing results [50] being applied to the time and conjugate-time
POVMs. We can, however, dilate the time and conjugate-time
operators by forsaking the constraint of positive frequency
on photon-annihilation operators [51, 52]. Such dilations are
well justified for the quantum theory of coincidence measure-
ment [46, 53], because the negative frequency components do
not contribute to detection outcomes. But, because we are
not assured that the dilation-assumption c(δ, βD) will suffice
for our security proof, we derive the following entropic un-
certainty relation for time and conjugate-time measurements
without dilation in Sec. IV:
Hǫmin(XA|E) +Hǫmax(YA|YB) ≥ −nT,µ1 log2
(
1.37δ2
2π2βD
)
,
(3)
Next, we use a generalized chain-rule result [54] to de-
composeXA into X0AX1AXmA, which is a concatenation of the
raw keys arising from vacuum, single-pair, and multi-pair co-
incidences. Neglecting the multi-pair contribution, we have
nT,µ1 ≥ (nT,0 + nT,1), with nT,0 and nT,1 being lower
bounds on nT,0 and nT,1, the coincidence-count contributions
from vacuum and single-pair events, respectively, when Al-
ice’s SPDC intensity is µ1 (see Appendix C). We then have
the following lower bound on the smooth min-entropy [44]:
Hǫmin(XA|E) ≥ −(nT,0 + nT,1) log2[c(δ, βD)]
−Hǫmax(YA|YB) . (4)
Using a result from CV-QKD [28], we get the following upper
bound on the smooth max-entropy:
Hǫmax(YA|YB) ≤ nT,µ1 log2[γ(d0 +∆)], (5)
where γ(x) obeys
γ(x) =
(
x+
√
1 + x2
)( x√
1 + x2 − 1
)x
. (6)
The ∆ parameter is the statistical fluctuation that quantifies
how well the data subset used for parameter estimation repre-
sents the entire dataset,
∆ ≈ Tf
δ
√
1
q2(1 − q)2nT,01 ln
1
ǫs/4− 2f(pα, nT,01) , (7)
where f(pα, nT,01) =
√
2(1− (1− pα)nT,01). and pα is the
probability, for a given pump pulse, that Alice and Bob de-
tect photons separated by more than a frame duration, Tf , and
nT,01 = nT,0 + nT,1.
Combining the preceding results, we obtain the following
lower bound on the secret-key length:
ℓ ≥ −nT,01 log2[c(δ, βD)]− nT,µ1 log2[γ(d0 +∆)]
− leakEC + log2(ǫ2sǫc). (8)
4IV. TIME-CONJUGATE TIME ENTROPIC
UNCERTAINTY RELATION
To justify (3), we only need to evaluate the overlap,
c(δ, βD), in (2) for the discretized single-photon time and
conjugate-time measurement operators that derive from their
continuous-time counterparts, T (t) and W (t), by coarse-
graining to time bins of duration δ. Here, we omit polariza-
tion degrees of freedom as they do not affect the overlap. Our
starting point is the infinite-dimensional version of the gen-
eral uncertainty relation for smooth min-entropy and smooth
max-entropy [38] that was derived in [27].
We use |ω〉 = a†(ω + ω0)|0〉 to denote the single-photon
state detuned by frequency ω from some fixed center fre-
quency ω0. (Later, this center frequency will be ωP /2, i.e.,
half the SPDC source’s pump frequency.) This state satis-
fies the orthonormality condition 〈ω1|ω2〉 = 2π δ(ω1 − ω2).
The single-photon Hilbert space is simply H = L2(Ω), i.e.,
the space of square-integrable, complex-valued functions on
the frequency-domain region ω ∈ Ω ≡ [ωmin,∞), where the
minimum detuning satisfies ωmin ≥ ω0. In particular, we as-
sociate a function f ∈ L2(Ω) to the state
|f〉 =
∫
Ω
dω
2π
f(ω)|ω〉 , (9)
so the inner product between two such states, |f〉 and |g〉, is
〈f |g〉 = ∫Ω dω2π f∗(ω)g(ω).
Using the above notation we have that the time-
measurement operator T (t) can be expressed as
T (t) =
∫
Ω
dω1
2π
∫
Ω
dω2
2π
ei(ω1−ω2)t|ω1〉〈ω2| = |φt〉〈φt| ,
(10)
where φt(ω) = eiωt. Similarly, we can write
W (t) =
∫
Ω
dω1
2π
∫
Ω
dω2
2π
ei(ω1−ω2)teiβD(ω
2
1
−ω2
2
)/4|ω1〉〈ω2|
(11)
= |ψt〉〈ψt| ,
where ψt(ω) = ei(ωt+βDω
2/4)
. We then introduce parti-
tions, {Ik} and {Jk}, of the time and conjugate-time axes,
from which we obtain the coarse-grained versions of T (t) and
W (t), namely the POVMs T δ = {Tk} and W δ = {Wk},
where
Tk =
∫
Ik
dt T (t) and Wk =
∫
Jk
dtW (t) . (12)
From [27, 38] the overlap for these discrete POVMs satisfies
c(δ, βD) = c¯(T
δ,W δ)
= sup
k,l
∥∥∥√Tk√Wl∥∥∥2
= sup
s,t
∥∥∥∥
√
T δ(s)
√
W δ(t)
∥∥∥∥
2
, (13)
where T δ(s) =
∫ s+δ
s du T (u) and W
δ(t) =
∫ t+δ
t duW (u).
Because the {Tk} and {Wk} are not projective, it is dif-
ficult to evaluate Eq. (13) directly. Instead, we will use the
approximation from [27], in which an uncertainty relation is
derived in the continuous-time case. We take T and W to
represent the continuous-time classical outcomes of the time
and conjugate-time measurements, and Tδ and Wδ to be their
discretized versions. From [27] we have that
Hmin(Tδ|E) ≥ hmin(T |E)− log2(δ) (14)
Hmax(Wδ|B) ≥ hmax(W|B)− log2(δ) , (15)
where hmin(T |E) and hmax(T |B) are the differential min-
entropy and differential max-entropy of the continuous-time
outcome T conditioned on Eve’s state (E) and Bob’s state
(B), respectively. We also know that these differential en-
tropies satisfy [27]
hmin(T |E) + hmax(W|B) ≥ − log2[c¯∞(T,W )] , (16)
where
c¯∞(T,W ) = lim inf
δ→0
[
c¯(T δ,W δ)
δ2
]
. (17)
Inequalities (14) and (15) yield the following uncertainty re-
lation for coarse-grained measurements:
Hmin(Tδ|E) +Hmax(Wδ|B) ≥ − log2[c¯∞(T,W )δ2]. (18)
We can find the overlap for the differential entropies via
c¯∞(T,W ) = lim inf
δ→0
[
c¯(T δ,W δ)
δ2
]
= sup
s,t
lim inf
δ→0
[
1
δ2
∥∥∥∥
√
T δ(s)
√
W δ(t)
∥∥∥∥
2
]
= sup
s,t
lim inf
δ→0
∥∥∥∥∥
√
T δ(s)
δ
√
W δ(t)
δ
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= sup
s,t
∥∥∥√T (s)√W (t)∥∥∥2 , (19)
where we have used limδ→0 1δ
∫ s+δ
s
dt T (t) = T (s) and simi-
larly for W . Inserting the definitions of T (s) and W (t) from
Eqs. (10) and (11), we obtain
c¯∞(T,W ) = sup
s,t
|〈φs|ψt〉|2 . (20)
A simple calculation now gives us
c¯∞(T,W ) = sup
s,t
∣∣∣∣
∫
Ω
dω
2π
eiω(t−s)e−iβDω
2/4
∣∣∣∣
2
, (21)
ForΩ = [ωmin,∞), performing the optimization with ωmin >
−ω0 and −∞ < t, s <∞ yields the maximum overlap
c¯∞(T,W ) ≈ 1.37
2π2βD
. (22)
5Inserting the above result into (18) gives us the overlap for the
discrete measurements used in the secret-key length bound
c(δ, βD) ≈ 1.37δ
2
2π2βD
. (23)
This uncertainty bound is tighter than the c(δ, βD) =
δ2/2π2βD overlap, obtained in Appendix B, when dilation is
used by taking Ω = (−∞,∞) so that the T (t) and W (t) op-
erators become projective and maximally incompatible, i.e.,
analogous to position and momentum. These overlap results
showcase the subtle difference between the entropic uncer-
tainty relation of quantum time and conjugate-time measure-
ments and that of the homodyne measurements from [28]. In-
deed, the factor of 1.37 in Eq. (23) is crucial for the general-
attack security of HD-QKD, because a secret-key length that
presumed the dilation result for the overlap would be insecure.
V. PERFORMANCE EXAMPLE
ηd Y0 σjit α βD Rrep
90% 1 kHz 18 ps 0.21 dB/km 2× 104 ps2 55.6 MHz [55]
σcor σcoh δ βe q ǫ
2 ps 6 ns 20 ps 0.91 0.9 10−10
TABLE I: List of parameters, mostly from [17], used in numeri-
cal evaluation: detection efficiency ηd, dark-count rate Y0, detector
time jitter σjit [56], fiber-loss coefficient α, GVD coefficient βD ,
system clock rate Rrep, biphoton correlation time σcor, pump co-
herence time σcoh ≈ Tf , time-bin duration δ, reconciliation (error-
correction) efficiency βe, probability of choosing the time basis q,
and overall security bound ǫ.
Parameters BB84 [44] CV-QKD [43] HD-QKD
PIE (bits/photon)a ≈ 0.1 0.5 3.3
Key rate at 0 Dist (bits/s) ≈ 8 Mb ≈ 6 Mc 8.6 M
Max Dist. (km) 170 16 96
aPIE in HD-QKD is defined as secret bits per single photon detection by
Bob given that Alice has made a detection in the same basis; PIE in BB84 is
defined as secret bits per use [57]; and PIE in CV-QKD is defined as secret
bits per signal [43].
bAssumes a decoy-state BB84 system with a 1 GHz clock rate [57].
cAssumes a CV-QKD system with the same 55.6 MHz clock rate as HD-
QKD.
TABLE II: Performance comparison for different protocols with
finite-key analysis against general attacks. The first and second rows
compare the PIEs and the secret keys rate at 0 km fiber length. The
third row compares the maximum secure-transmission distance. All
three protocols are evaluated at the a block size of 109, equivalent
to a 1 min running time in HD-QKD with parameters specified in
Table I.
Based on the secret-key rate formula (8), we numerically
evaluated the performance of the time-energy HD-QKD pro-
tocol in the finite-key regime under general attacks. See Ta-
ble I for the parameters that were assumed. The calculated
secret-key rates and PIEs at different lengths of standard tele-
com fiber are shown in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b). We see that HD-
QKD can easily tolerate a 100 km standard fiber within a rea-
sonable running time for transmission (e.g., 10 min). This
secure-transmission distance significantly exceeds that of CV-
QKD (around 10 km [43]). In addition, the secret-key rate
of HD-QKD at zero distance is about 8.6 Mbit/s (see Ta-
ble II), which is comparable to that of CV-QKD with the same
55.6 MHz clock rate, and to that of decoy-state BB84 with a
state-of-the-art 1 GHz clock rate [57]. Moreover, HD-QKD
can offer a higher PIE, up to 4.3 bits/photon (with 30 min run-
ning time), than does decoy-state BB84 [44], whose PIE can
never exceed 1 bit per use.
In Fig. 1(c) we show the secret-key rate as a function of
block size. Here we see that the minimum required block
size for HD-QKD is slightly larger than those of decoy-state
BB84 [44] and CV-QKD [43]. Finally, Fig. 1(d) plots the
secret-key rate versus transmission distance for different time-
bin durations, showing that shorter duration time bins offer
higher key rates for a given biphoton source. We remark that
detectors with less than 20 ps jitter have already been demon-
strated in recent experiments [56].
Our work clarifies how the secret-key rate of time-energy
HD-QKD using dispersive-optics depends on the time-bin
duration δ and the GVD coefficient βD. Indeed, a higher
GVD coefficient and a lower detector time jitter—so that time-
bin duration may be decreased—might increase HD-QKD’s
secret-key rate. The secret-key rates shown in Fig. 1 have al-
ready presumed a bin duration limited by state-of-the-art de-
tector time jitter, but the βD value used is achievable with
commercial devices [16]. Increasing the GVD coefficient
without changing the other system parameters, however, does
not always increase the secret-key rate. In particular, (8)
shows that aK-fold increase in βD increases secret-key length
by nT,01 log2(K), if there is no offsetting increase in the error
rate between Alice and Bob’s raw keys, as quantified by the
γ(d0+∆) term in (5). Our numerical evaluation of the secret-
key rate at zero distance versus βD—using the other param-
eters from Table I and the d0 = 2 threshold code distance
employed in Fig. 1—verifies this insight, see Fig. 2. Here
we see the secret-key rate initially increasing linearly with in-
creasing log10(βD), until it saturates and begins to decrease.
Saturation occurs because our protocol requires d0 > dmin for
there to be a positive secret-key rate, and the minimum thresh-
old code distance increases with increasing βD, as shown in
Appendix D. So, the secret-key rate saturation and decay in
Fig. 2 results from the d0 increases that are required at high
βD values. That said, Fig. 2 still shows that the highest key
rate, 17 Mbit/s, is realized with the experimentally feasible
β = 2 × 106 ps2 [16], and we have found that the maximum
distance for a non-zero secret-key rate is then 210 km.
VI. SUMMARY
We have reported the general-attack security analysis for
the time-energy HD-QKD protocol in the finite-key regime by
combining the entropic uncertainty-relation security analysis
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FIG. 1: Numerically-evaluated performance of time-energy HD-QKD with threshold code distance d0 = 2 and other parameters as listed
in Table I. (a) Secret-key rate (bits/s) versus transmission distance (km) for different total running times of transmission: top curve (yellow)
30 min, middle curve (red) 10 min, bottom curve (blue) 1 min. (b) PIE (bits/photon) versus transmission distance (km) for different running
times: top curve (yellow) 30 min, middle curve (red) 10 min, bottom curve (blue) 1 min. (c) Secret-key rate (bits/s) versus block size (running
time/clock rate) for different transmission distances: top curve (blue) 0 km, middle curve (red) 20 km, bottom curve (yellow) 40 km. (d)
Secret-key rate (bits/s) versus transmission distance (km) for different time-bin durations δ, where the running time is fixed at 30 min: top
curve (blue) 20 ps, middle curve (red), 80 ps, bottom curve (yellow) 100 ps.
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FIG. 2: Secret-key rate at zero distance versus GVD coefficient
log10(βD) for 30 min running time. The conventional units for βD
are employed here: ps per nm of bandwidth at telecom wavelength.
The secret-key rate at zero distance achieves its 17 Mbit/s maximum
at βD = 105 ps/nm at telecom wavelength, which is equivalent to
2× 106 ps2 in the units used in Table I.
of CV-QKD with the decoy-state technique from DV-QKD.
In particular, we derived a new entropic uncertainty relation
for the time and conjugate-time operators using optical dis-
persion transformations. This result validates the difference
between the uncertainty relation of time and conjugate-time
operators and that of conventional maximally-incompatible
operators, such as position and momentum. With the new
uncertainty bound, we showed that under the most powerful
attacks time-energy HD-QKD can produce a higher PIE than
conventional decoy-state BB84 and CV-QKD, and still tol-
erate long-distance fiber transmission. We also showed that
optimizing the HD-QKD protocol’s GVD coefficient enables
realizing a 17Mbit/s secret-key rate at zero distance and a
210 km maximum secure-transmission distance, the latter be-
ing comparable to that of state-of-the-art decoy-state BB84.
We expect this finding will provide theoretical support for op-
timizing HD-QKD implementations. Our results constitute
an important step toward the unified understanding of dis-
tinct QKD schemes that is needed for development of prac-
tical long-distance high-rate quantum communication.
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Appendix A: Protocol
a. Preliminaries Before contacting Bob, Alice makes mea-
surements on her trusted spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) source of time-energy entangled
biphotons to determine the coherence time of the pulsed
pump field σcoh, the biphoton correlation time σcor,
and the SPDC intensities {µ1, µ2, µ3}, i.e., the mean
photon-pairs generated per pump pulse with different
pump powers. Then, Alice and Bob use a pre-shared
key to authenticate each other, after which they negoti-
ate parameters to be employed during the protocol run.
b. Biphoton preparation and distribution Alice pumps her
SPDC source at a clock rate (repetition rate) Rrep. For
each pump pulse, Alice prepares a time-energy entan-
gled state within a Tf -duration (Tf ≈ σcoh) frame cen-
tered on the peak of the pump pulse. She sends one
photon to Bob via a quantum channel (e.g., an optical
fiber) and retains the companion photon for her own
measurements. To implement decoy states [5, 6, 24],
Alice randomly pumps the SPDC source to select in-
tensities µk ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ3} with probabilities pk ∈
{pµ1 , pµ2 , pµ3}.
c. Measurement phase For each frame, Alice and Bob se-
lect their measurement basis at random and indepen-
dently from {T,W} with probabilities {q, 1 − q} and
perform measurements in their chosen bases. Their
T-basis measurements are made using time-resolved
single-photon detectors with a temporal resolution set
primarily by the detectors’ time jitter, σjit [17]. They
sort their data into time bins of duration δ, where
σcor ≪ σjit < δ ≪ σcoh, that will generate log2(Tf/δ)
raw-key bits when they both obtain T-basis photon de-
tections in the same frame. Their W-basis measure-
ments are realized by means of dispersive optics and
single-photon detection [21], i.e., they pass their pho-
tons through normal and anomalous group-velocity dis-
persion (GVD) elements, respectively, measure them
with time-resolved single-photon detectors, and then
sort that data into duration-δ time bins.
d. Basis reconciliation Alice and Bob announce their mea-
surement bases over an authenticated public channel
and discard all measurement results for frames in which
they measured in different bases. They are then left with
detection-time coincidence measurements of nT (nW)
frames in which they both used the T (W) basis and
both obtained one photon detection.
e. Decoy-state processing Alice announces her SPDC inten-
sity choice for each frame. Alice and Bob thus iden-
tify sets Tµk and Wµk for µk ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ3}, in which
they have both made T-basis or W-basis measurements
when Alice’s SPDC source intensity was µk. They re-
peat their quantum communication, i.e., steps (b)–(e),
until the cardinality of these sets satisfies: |Tµk | ≥
nT,µk and |Wµk | ≥ nW,µk , where {nT,µk , nW,µk} are
pre-chosen values that ensure sufficient quality in the
ensuing parameter estimation steps. Note that nT =∑
µk
nT,µk . Next, they publicly announce their W-
basis detection times {twa,j,µk , twb,j,µk} for each SPDC
intensity, where a, b denote Alice and Bob, j indexes
the frame, and each detection-time value is relative to
the peak of its associated pump pulse. After that, they
compute these detection times’ mean-squared differ-
ences for each µk, viz., σ2cor,W,µk =
∑
j(t
w
a,j,µk
−
twb,j,µk)
2/nW,µk . By virtue of their use of normal and
anomalous GVD elements, σ2cor,W,µk can be used to
find the anti-correlation between the detunings from the
SPDC outputs’ center frequencies of the single-photon
pairs (i.e., biphotons) that Alice and Bob detected in
their W-basis measurements when Alice’s SPDC inten-
sity was µk [21], see Appendix C.
f. Parameter estimation Alice and Bob use only their µ1
data for secret-key generation, while they use their µ2
and µ3 data for parameter estimation. Alice and Bob
use their T-basis data to estimate nT,0, the number of
frames out of their nT,µ1 that are due to vacuum co-
incidences (either Alice or Bob did not detect a pho-
ton), and nT,1, the number of frames out of their nT,µ1
that are due to single-pair coincidences (Alice and Bob
each detected one photon). They use their W-basis
data to estimate dW,1, the L1 distance between their
detected photons’ frequency detunings (after account-
ing for their anti-correlation) that is due to single-pair
coincidences [24, 44] (see Appendix. C). Finally, they
check that dW,1 is less than d0, where d0 is a predeter-
mined threshold (see Appendix. D). If this condition is
not met, they abort the protocol. Otherwise they pro-
ceed to the protocol’s next step.
g. Key generation and error correction Alice and Bob use
their T-basis data to generate raw keys (XA,XB) from
the frames in which Alice’s SPDC intensity was µ1.
Each frame used in generating these raw keys contains
log2(Tf/δ) bits. Alice and Bob perform error correc-
tion on their raw keys using an algorithm with recon-
ciliation efficiency βe ≤ 1 [58]. This procedure re-
veals at most leakEC bits of information to Eve. Next,
to ensure that they have shared identical keys, Alice and
Bob perform key verification using a two-universal hash
function that publishes ⌈log2(1/ǫhash)⌉ bits of informa-
tion, with ǫhash being the probability that a pair of non-
identical keys passes the test.
h. Calculation of secret-key length Using the results from
(f) and (g), Alice and Bob calculate the secret-key
length ℓ. If ℓ is negative, they abort the protocol.
Otherwise, they apply another (different) two-universal
hash function (for privacy amplification) to their error-
corrected raw keys to produce the length-ℓ secret keys,
8KA andKB.
Appendix B: Time-frequency uncertainty relation for dilated
measurements
To compare with the overlap developed in the main text, we
derive the overlap with dilation in this appendix. Instead of the
frequency domain, it is now more convenient to work in the
time domain, using |t〉 = a†(t)|0〉 to denote the single-photon
localized at time t that satisfies the orthonormality condition
〈t1|t2〉 = δ(t1 − t2). The single-photon Hilbert space is sim-
plyH = L2(T ), i.e., the space of square-integrable, complex-
valued functions on the time-domain t ∈ T . We evaluate the
overlap under dilation [51, 52] when T = (−∞,∞). In this
case, the POVMs T (t) and W (t) for the time and conjugate-
time measurements are projection valued [21]:
T (t) = |t〉〈t|, (B1)
W (t) = UT (t)U †. (B2)
Here, W (t) is obtained from T (t) via the unitary transforma-
tion
U =
1√
πβD
∫ ∞
−∞
dt1
∫ ∞
−∞
dt2 e
−i(t1−t2)
2/βD |t1〉〈t2|. (B3)
The associated time and conjugate-time observables are then
Ot =
∫ ∞
−∞
dt t|t〉〈t|, (B4)
Dt =
1
πβD
∫ ∞
−∞
dt t
∫ ∞
−∞
dt1
∫ ∞
−∞
dt2 e
−i(t2
1
−t2
2
)/βD
× e2i(t1−t2)t/βD |t1〉〈t2|. (B5)
The conjugate-time observable can be further simplified as
follows:
Dt =
1
πβD
∫ ∞
−∞
dt1
∫ ∞
−∞
dt2 e
−i(t2
1
−t2
2
)/βD
(
∂
∂t1
∫ ∞
−∞
dt
βD
2i
e2i(t1−t2)t/βD
)
|t1〉〈t2|, (B6)
=
βD
2i
∫ ∞
−∞
dt1 e
−it2
1
/βD |t1〉
(
∂
∂t1
∫ ∞
−∞
dt2 e
it2
2
/βDδ(t1 − t2)〈t2|
)
(B7)
=
∫ ∞
∞
dt1 t1|t1〉〈t1|+ βD
2i
∫ ∞
−∞
dt1 |t1〉 ∂
∂t1
〈t1| (B8)
= Ot + πβDOω, (B9)
where Oω =
∫∞
−∞
dω
2π ω|ω〉〈ω| is the conventional unbounded-
frequency observable that is maximally incompatible with the
time observable. It immediately follows that
[Ot, Dt] = iπβD. (B10)
Finally, using the overlap result for maximally-
incompatible observables [50], we obtain
c(δ, βD) =
δ2
2π2βD
, (B11)
for the dilated measurements. Compared with the overlap de-
rived with non-projective POVM in Sec. IV, this overlap is
slightly smaller, and thus offers a weaker bound on the uncer-
tainty relation. In the paper we therefore used the non-dilated
overlap in bounding the secret-key length.
Appendix C: Decoy states with finite keys
A decoy-state method for HD-QKD in the asymptotic
regime was previously derived in [24]. Here, based on [44],
we extend the work in [24] to the finite-key case against gen-
eral attacks (i.e., without any assumptions on the statistical
distributions). We presume that Alice randomly chooses be-
tween three intensity levels, µ1, µ2 and µ3 for her SPDC
source. Let sT,n be the number of frames in which Alice and
Bob both measure in the T basis and Alice’s source has emit-
ted n biphotons in each frame, so that nT =
∑∞
n=0 sT,n is the
total number of frames in which Alice and Bob both made
T-basis measurements. In the asymptotic regime, nT,µk ,
the number frames in which Alice’s source intensity was µk
and she and Bob made T-basis measurements, approaches its
ensemble-average value, namely
nT,µk → n∗T,µk =
∞∑
n=0
pµ|n(µk|n)sT,n, for µk ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ3},
where pµ|n(µk|n) is the conditional probability of Alice’s
source emitting n = n biphotons in a frame, given its source
intensity was µ = µk. For finite sample sizes, Hoeffding’s
inequality for independent events [59] implies that nT,µk will
9satisfy ∣∣n∗T,µk − nT,µk ∣∣ ≤ ζ(nT, ǫ1), (C1)
with probability at least 1 − 2ǫ1, where ζ(nT, ǫ1) :=√
nT log(1/ǫ1)/2. Note that the deviation term ζ(nT, ǫ1) is
the same for all µk. Inequality (C1) allows us to establish
a relation between the asymptotic values {n∗
T,µk
} and the ob-
served values {nT,µk}. More precisely, we have the following
bounds for finite-key analysis:
n∗
T,µk
≤ nT,µk + ζ(nT, ǫ1) =: nT,µk , (C2)
n∗T,µk ≥ nT,µk − ζ(nT, ǫ1) =: nT,µk . (C3)
a. Lower-bound on the number of vacuum coincidences, nT,0
The following lower bound on sT,0 was derived in
Ref. [44]:
sT,0 ≥ sT,0 = τ0
(µ2 − µ3)
(
µ2e
µ3nT,µ3
pµ3
− µ3e
µ2nT,µ2
pµ2
)
.
(C4)
Using this result we obtain the lower bound on the number
of vacuum coincidences when Alice’s source intensity is µ1
given by
nT,0 ≥ nT,0 = sT,0pµ|n(µ1|0).
b. Lower bound on the number of single-pair coincidences, nT,1
The following lower bound on sT,1 was derived in
Ref. [44]:
sT,1 ≥ sT,1 = µ1τ1
µ1(µ2 − µ3)− (µ22 − µ23)
[
eµ2nT,µ2
pµ2
− e
µ3nT,µ3
pµ3
+
µ22 − µ23
µ21
(
sT,0
τ0
− e
µ1nT,µ1
pµ1
)]
. (C5)
Using this result we obtain the lower bound on the number of
single-pair coincidences when Alice’s source intensity is µ1
given by
nT,1 ≥ nT,1 = sT,1pµ1|1 − ζ(sT,1pµ|n(µ1|1), ǫ2),
with probability at least 1− 2ǫ2.
c. Upper bound on the L1 distance of single-pair coincidences,
dW,1
After the non-local dispersion cancellation that occurs
when Alice and Bob both make W-basis measurements on the
same frame, their mean-square time difference, σ2cor,W,µk for
µk ∈ {µ1, µ2, µ3}, can be written as
σ2cor,W,µk =
pµ|n(µk|1)sW,1
nW,µk
σ2cor,W,1
+
(
1− pµ|n(µk|1)sW,1
nW,µk
)
σ2cor,W,m,
where σ2cor,W,1 and σ2cor,W,m are the mean-squared differences
due to single-pair and multiple-pair coincidences including all
source intensities, and sW,1 is the number of frames in which
Alice and Bob both measure in the W basis given that Alice’s
source has emitted 1 biphoton in each frame. Then, we have
nW,µ2σ
2
cor,W,µ2 − nW,µ3σ2cor,W,µ3 =
sW,1σ
2
cor,W,1[pµ|n(µ2|1)− pµ|n(µ3|1)]
+ σ2cor,W,m[nW,µ2 − nW,µ3
+ pµ|n(µ3|1)sW,1 − pµ|n(µ2|1)sW,1], (C6)
where the σ2cor,W,m term on the right is non-negative for µ2 >
µ3. Dropping the σ2cor,W,m term, the preceding result can be
rearranged to provide the lower bound
σ2cor,W,1 ≤ σ2cor,W,1 =
nW,µ2σ
2
cor,W,µ2
− nW,µ3σ2cor,W,µ3
sW,1(pµ|n(µ2|1)− pµ|n(µ3|1))
,
(C7)
where the sW,1 lower bound, sW,1, can be derived using the
same method employed in [44] to obtain inequality (C5). Our
upper bound on the L1 distance of single-pair coincidences is
then
dW,1 =
√
2
π
σ2cor,W,1, (C8)
where the
√
2/π factor arises from relating L1 distance to
the mean-squared difference of jointly Gaussian random vari-
ables.
Appendix D: Theoretical model for the threshold, d0
To find the threshold, d0, for the mean-squared difference
between Alice and Bob’s single-pair W-basis measurements
beyond which Alice and Bob will abort the QKD protocol,
we start from the time and frequency wave-functions for the
biphoton emission when Alice’s SPDC source is pumped by a
pulse centered at time t = 0 [23], i.e.,
ψ(tS , tI) =
exp(−t2−/4σ2coh − t2+/4σ2cor − iωP t+)√
2πσcohσcor
,
(D1)
Ψ(ωS , ωI) =
exp(−ω2−σ2cor/4− 4ω2+σ2coh)√
π/2σcohσcor
. (D2)
Here: tS and tI denote the times of the biphoton’s signal and
idler photons, and ωS and ωI denote their frequencies; t+ :=
10
(tS + tI)/2, t− := tS − tI , ω+ := (ωS + ωI)/2, and ω− :=
ωS − ωI ; and we have assumed that Alice’s source is phase
matched at frequency degeneracy for its pump’s ωP center
frequency.
When both Alice and Bob choose the conjugate-time basis,
they send their photons into normal and anomalous group-
velocity dispersion elements whose dispersion coefficients
have common magnitude βD but opposite signs. After the
propagation through the dispersive elements at Alice and
Bob’s terminal, the frequency wave-function becomes
ΨD(ωS , ωI) =
exp[−ω2−σ2cor/4− 4ω2+σ2coh + iβD/4(ω2S − ω2I )]√
π/2σcohσcor
, (D3)
from which the associated time wave-function can be found
via
ψD(tS , tI) =
1
2π
∫ ∞
∞
dωS
∫ ∞
−∞
dωI ΨD(ωS , ωI)e
−i(ωStS+ωItI). (D4)
The W-basis mean-squared time difference in the absence of
Eve is therefore
σ2cor,W =
∫ ∞
−∞
dtS
∫ ∞
−∞
dtI (tS − tI)2|ψD(tS , tI)|2 (D5)
=
σ2cohσ
2
cor + (βD/4)
2
σ2coh
, (D6)
= σ2cor +
β2D
16σ2coh
(D7)
This correlation time measures how strongly Alice and
Bob’s single photons are correlated in the conjugate-time ba-
sis in the absence of Eve. Subsequently, we find the minimum
L1 distance for conjugate-time measurement outcomes with-
out any third-party interference to be
dmin =
√
16σ2cohσ
2
cor + β
2
D
8πσ2cohδ
2
, (D8)
where the 1/δ factor normalizes the root-mean-square time
difference into time bins and the
√
2/π factor converts root-
mean-square bin difference into L1 distance. The d0 that de-
termines when Alice and Bob will abort their QKD protocol
thus should be bigger than dmin in order to have non-zero key
rate. In our performance evaluation, whose results are shown
in Fig. 1, we chose d0 = 2. This value is well above this dmin
lower bound for the parameter values given in Table I.
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